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In response to cost changes, prices often rise more strongly or quickly than they
fall. This phenomenon has attracted attention from economists, policymakers, and
the general public for decades. Many assert that it cannot be explained by standard
economic theory, and is evidence for anti-competitivebehaviour by rms. This paper
argues against this conventional wisdom; it shows that simple price theory can, in
principle, account for such asymmetric pass-through even with perfect competition.
From a policy perspective, knowledge of cost pass-through patterns in a market does
not allow for strong inferences on the intensity of competition.
Keywords: Asymmetric price transmission, cost pass-through, electricity markets,
price theory, rockets and feathers
1 Introduction & motivation
The phenomenon that, in response to changes in costs, prices often seem to rise more
strongly or quickly than they fall has attracted the attention of economists, policymakers,
and the general public, for decades.
In a famous article, Peltzman (2000) nds that across a broad sample of 242 markets,
prices rise faster than they fallin around two thirds of cases. This nding is robust across
markets that are perfectly competitive and those with signicant industry concentration
(market power). Many other studies have found asymmetric cost pass-through, with
notable examples including markets for gasoline, various agricultural products, deposit
markets in retail banking, and carbon emissions permits.
My thanks are due to Simon Cowan, Stephen Littlechild, David Newbery, Michael Pollitt, and David
Stallibrass for helpful comments and suggestions. I am also grateful for the hospitality of MITs Center for
Energy and Environmental Policy Research (CEEPR) where parts of this paper were written. All views
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At the same time, however, there are many markets in which pass-through is symmetric
(around 30% of Peltzmans sample, for instance) and, at least in some cases, prices appear
to rise less strongly than they fall (Ward, 1982; Meyer and von Cramon-Taubadel, 2004).
These phenomena also receive much policy attention. For example, the June 2014
referral by Ofgem, the UKs energy regulator, of the electricity sector to the competition
authority (CMA) was inuenced by the public perception, true or false, that rockets
and feathers is endemic to this sector. Indeed, in British political circles and public
debate, there seems to be a widely-held view that such asymmetric pass-through is a
strong indicator for an uncompetitivemarket.1 One of the working papers produced by
this investigation to date (CMA, 2015) is on cost pass-through at the retail level, though
the analysis is so far only descriptive and does not draw any rm conclusions on the
existence of, and explanations for, asymmetric price transmission.2
Over the last decade, various economic theories have been advanced with a view to
explaining asymmetric pass-through. Perhaps most prominent are models with consumer
search costs: some consumers are imperfectly informed about prices and/or rmscosts,
and respond di¤erently depending on whether costs rise or fall; asymmetric pricing on the
upside can arise even where competition amongst rms is (otherwise) perfect (Tappata,
2009). Other explanations have been based on collusive behaviour, vertical integration,
and various sorts of adjustment costs.
Existing papers routinely claim that standard theorycannot account for asymmetric
pass-through, so that this phenomenon represents both a failure of markets, and a failure
of (textbook) economics. Peltzman (2000) writes that In the paradigmatic price theory
that we teach, input price increases or decreases move marginal costs and then price up or
down symmetrically and reversibly(p. 465), speaks of a theoretical vacuum(p. 488),
and concludes that This asymmetry is fairly labelled a stylized fact. This fact poses a
challenge to theory (. . . ) the evidence in this paper suggests that the theory is wrong, at
least insofar as an asymmetric response to costs is not its general implication (p. 493).
Kimmel (2009) writes it is true that asymmetric pricing cannot happen in simplistically
competitive market models(p. 3). Tappata (2009) notes that according to traditional
economic theory, homogeneous rms that compete on prices earn zero prot, and cost
shocks are completely transferred to nal prices(p. 674). It is striking that none of these
papers make precise what exactly the standard theorybeing criticized actually is.3
This paper challenges the current state of thinking on pass-through. It shows that
1Some go further by claiming that the existence of asymmetric pass-through on the upside proves
market power, and, conversely, that its absence demonstrates competition; in other words, a market is
uncompetitive if and only if pass-through is asymmetric.
2The relevant passage states that: We will assess qualitatively possible reasons why domestic energy
prices were not reduced in periods when costs decreased substantially, as observed from our initial descrip-
tive analysis . . . We will then consider whether the reasons for asymmetric cost pass-through, if there is
any, are inconsistent with competition(CMA, 2015).
3Peltzman (2000) and Kimmel (2009) seem to have in mind a textbook model of perfect competition,
with price-taking rms as well as a horizontal supply curve; by contrast, Tappatas (2009) discussion
suggests the benchmark of oligopoly competition à la Bertrand, with price-setting rms and undi¤erentiated
products.
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even the simplest economic theories, properly applied, can account for asymmetric pass-
through; it is, as such, no puzzlefor economists at all. Simple theory can explain why
prices rise more strongly in some markets but also why they rise equally strongly or less
strongly in others. These ndings can arise under perfect competition as well as when rms
have market power. By contrast, many of the more elaborate theories rely on imperfect
competition and/or are tailored to only explain an asymmetry tilted to the upside.
The intuition is simply stated. Consider some model of competition in an industry
and let the equilibrium price depend on a marginal cost, which is common to rms and
can vary. If this equilibrium pricing function is linear, then a change in marginal cost
translates equally into some change in price, regardless of whether it goes up or down.
However, if the pricing function is (strictly) convex in cost, then starting from any point, a
given discrete cost increase raises price by more than an identically-sized cost decrease cuts
price. Put di¤erently, with a convex pricing function, the marginal rate of pass-through
exceeds the average pass-through, and so pass-through is higher at higher levels of cost
(and price). This paper shows that such convexity can arise, under natural conditions, in
both perfectly and imperfectly competitive settings. Under perfect competition, it obtains,
e.g., if the market demand curve is convex and the supply curve is concave in price. The
opposite conclusions apply if the pricing function is (strictly) concave.
Many models exclude the possibility of asymmetric pass-through by doing one of two
things: (1) imposing a priori functional-form assumptions which imply that the equi-
librium pricing function is linear in marginal costs (such as assuming that demand and
supply curves are both linear), or (2) only considering innitesimal cost changes which, as
a feature of calculus rather than economics, mean that pass-through must be symmetric.
The rst of these assumptions is somewhat arbitrary, and perhaps di¢ cult to empirically
test, but is not implied in any way by economic principles; it is simply a special case. The
second assumption is an analytical simplication, which can be useful and appropriate in
some cases, but is problematic for a general analysis of pass-through; in the real world,
(cost) changes are discrete.4
In short, standard theory can feature all of convex, linear, and concave pricing
functions depending on the underlying market fundamentals of demand and supply
and, in principle, can thus explainall of the increasing, constant, and decreasing cost
pass-through found in the empirical work. So the right way to understand Peltzmans cri-
tique is that it is textbook expositions that may require revision, not necessarily standard
price theory itself.
Section 2 presents a generalized version of a standard Cournot model of imperfect
competition. Section 3 examines an elementary model of perfect competition. Section
4 discusses the relationship with the empirical literature, including static and dynamic
aspects of pass-through. Section 5 makes concluding remarks.
4 In recent important work, Weyl and Fabinger (2013) synthesize and extend many results in the theory
of cost pass-through, and show how it is a useful statistic to think about competition and the division of
surplus in markets. They do not discuss asymmetric cost pass-through.
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2 Asymmetric pass-through under imperfect competition
This section shows how asymmetric pass-through arises in a reasonably general-yet-simple
(static) model of imperfect competition, and identies the underlying conditions in terms
of demand and supplier conduct.
Model setup. An industry consists of a set of N = f1; 2; : : : ; ng rms, facing a common
inverse demand curve p(Q), where Q is total output, which is downward-sloping, pQ < 0.
Let    pQQQ=pQ denote a measure of the curvature of inverse demand, so demand
is convex if  > 0, and concave otherwise. Demand is log-concave, that is, logD(p) is
concave, if and only if  < 1. Firm j 2 N has constant marginal cost cj + t, where t is a
cost shifter common to all rms.
Competition is a generalized version of Cournot. Firm j chooses how much output
qj to sell into the market (so
P
j2N qj = Q) so as to maximize its prots. The product
market outcome is determined by a conduct parameter  > 0. When rm j changes its
output by dqj , it believes that industry output will change by dQ = (dqj) as a result. The
parameter  serves as a summary statistic of the intensity of competition in the market; it
may be regarded as a reduced-form representation of an (unmodelled) dynamic game. The
Cournot-Nash equilibrium, in which each rm takes its rivalsactions as given, is nested
where  = 1; lower values of  correspond to more competitive outcomes, with perfect
competition arising in the limit as  ! 0.
We assume that all n  2 rms are active with strictly positive output throughout,
and that the equilibrium is unique and stable. This requires that any cost di¤erences
between rms are not too large and that the demand curve is not too convex, for
which a su¢ cient condition is that industry revenue is concave in industry output, i.e.,
downward-sloping industry marginal revenue, @@Q (p+ pQQ) < 0,  < 2.
Marginal cost pass-through. The rst-order condition for rm js choice of output is:
0 = p+pQqj (cj + t). Let p(t) denote the equilibrium market price, as a function of the
cost shifter, and let (t)  (p(t))  [dp(t)=dt] denote the marginal rate of cost pass-
through.5 This captures how the equilibrium price varies with a small, i.e., innitesimal,
increase in rmsmarginal costs.
Lemma 1. The marginal rate of cost pass-through under imperfect competition equals
(t) = n= [n+ (1  )] and is less than 100% if and only if demand is log-concave  < 1.
Proof. Summing the n  2 rst-order conditions gives 0 = np + pQQ  
P
j2N (cj + t).
This expression implicitly denes the equilibrium total output Q(t) and the corresponding
equilibrium price p(t)  p(Q(t)). Di¤erentiation gives 0 = [npQ + pQ + pQQQ] dQ  
n dt, from which the expression for pass-through follows since (t) = [pQ  (dQ=dt)]Q=Q(t)
5 It is standard in the industrial-organization literature to look at the rate of pass-through, dp(t)=dt.
The literature on international trade, for example, often instead considers the elasticity of pass-through
d log p(t)=d log t; the arguments made in this paper could equally be applied to this measure.
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and    pQQQ=pQ. The result that (t) < 1 if and only if  < 1 follows by inspection,
since  > 0.
Pass-through can take on a very wide range of values; the marginal rate is always
positive but can lie anywhere between zero and innity, depending on the particular values
of n, , and . All else equal, a larger number of rms pushes pass-through towards 100%,
as does more competitive industry conduct (lower ). More concave demand (lower )
pushes pass-through towards zero, and if demand is log-convex with  > 1 (e.g., with
constant-elasticity demand), then pass-through exceeds 100%.
Many theory papers make the assumption that demand is log-concave, which corre-
sponds to pass-through less than 100%. On the empirical side, there is evidence for a wide
range of values for pass-through across di¤erent markets, including rates above 100%,
although the case with incompletepass-through is more common (see, e.g., Weyl and
Fabinger (2013) for a useful recent summary).
Non-marginal cost pass-through. Now consider the case of a large or discrete
increase in rmsmarginal costs. In particular, suppose that the cost shifter t rises over
an interval [0; T ], so that t = T . The non-marginal rate of pass-through is thus dened
as (T )  p=t.
Of course, the non-marginal pass-through is related to the underlying marginal rate.
By construction, the discrete change in price satisesp =
R T
0 (t)dt. So the non-marginal
rate of pass-through is simply equal to the average of marginal pass-through over the range
[0; T ], that is, (T ) = 1T
R T
0 (t)dt.
It is immediate that marginal and non-marginal pass-through coincide if only if mar-
ginal pass-through does not vary with the level of the cost shifter t, d(t)=dt = 0. This
feature in turn corresponds to a linear (strictly speaking, a¢ ne) pricing equation: since
(t)  (p(t))  [dp(t)=dt], it follows that d(t)=dt = 0 if and only if d2p(t)=dt2 = 0.
In such cases, pricing is symmetric.
More generally, there can be asymmetric pass-through. In particular, marginal pass-
through is increasing if and only if the industrys equilibrium pricing function p(t) is
(strictly) convex. In such cases, marginal pass-through lies above average pass-through,
(s) > (s) for any s 2 (0; T ). This has two key implications, starting at any given cost
level: (i) the rate of pass-through for a largecost increase exceeds that for a smallcost
increase; (ii) a marginal cost increase is passed on more strongly than an identically-sized
decrease in cost: prices rise more strongly than they fall.6
The opposite conclusions apply in cases for which marginal pass-through is decreasing,
i.e., where the market pricing equation is instead concave in costs so then, on average,
prices rise less strongly than they fall.
The following result maps these arguments into industry characteristics.
6The rst of these two points links to another literature, more closely associated with macroeconomics,
on price inertia and menu costs, which we do not further pursue here.
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Proposition 1 (a) Cost pass-through under imperfect competition is constant, d(t)=dt =
0, if and only if ddt [(p
(t))(1  (p(t)))] = 0 for all t 2 [0; T ]; otherwise, there is either
increasing or decreasing asymmetric pass-through somewhere on the interval [0; T ].
(b) Pass-through is increasing if the conduct parameter and demand curvature rise with
price, @=@p  0 and @=@p  0, with at least one strict inequality, for all t 2 [0; T ].
Proof. For (a), the necessary and su¢ cient condition follows by inspection of the ex-
pression for marginal pass-through from Lemma 1, recalling that the number of rms n
is xed, and making explicit the potential dependency of demand curvature  and the
conduct parameter  on the cost shifter t, via the equilibrium price p(t). For (b), the
su¢ cient conditions are immediate.
Since the number of rms in the market is xed (here by assumption, not necessarily in
practice), the only two industry characteristics that can cause variations in pass-through
are the curvature of demand  and the conduct parameter . Pass-through is only constant
where both  and  are constants, or where they move exactly in such a way that (1  )
stays xed.
Economic theory does not imply that either demand curvature or industry conduct
are constants. Several frequently-used demand curves exhibit constant curvature; this is
what gives tractability and makes them popular in the rst place. Examples are linear
demand ( = 1), exponential demand ( ! 1), and constant-elasticity demand ( =
1 +  1, where  > 0 is the price elasticity of demand). The class of demand functions
that exhibits the constant-curvature property is known (Bulow and Peiderer, 1983); it
corresponds to consumersvaluations being drawn from a Generalized Pareto Distribution
(Ausubel, Cramton, Pycia, Rostek and Weretka, 2014), which is the class of distributions
that generates a linear inverse hazard rate. However, for other specications, demand
is more convex at a higher price, @=@p > 0, including Normal/Gaussian, Laplace and
Logistic distributions (Weyl and Fabinger, 2014, Table 1; see also Cowan, 2012).
Unfortunately, there is scant evidence on what demand curves look like in reality; a
typical empirical industry study measures an average value of the demand elasticity but
this says little about the shape of the demand curve (and thus about pass-through).
Similarly, the conduct parameter, in general, need not be constant although, for
a particular mode of competition, it may be. The canonical example is Cournot-Nash
competition, for which always  = 1 regardless of market conditions. More generally,
industry conduct may become less competitive as at a higher price, @=@p > 0; for instance,
rms may nd it easier to tacitly coordinate on prices during demand booms, along the
lines of Green and Porter (1984). If so, cost pass-through tends to be pro-cyclical with
respect to price; pass-through is higher when price is already higher.
The bottom line is that even this basic theory can, in principle, explain why prices rise
more strongly than they fall by tracing this to variations in demand curvature and/or
rm conduct.
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Example. The results can be illustrated with monopoly pricing, for which n = 1 (and
also  = 1 since there are no rivals). By Lemma 1, the marginal rate of pass-through
satises (t) = 1=[2   (t)] =(slope of demand curve)/(slope of marginal revenue curve),
where (t) = (p(t)) (Bulow and Peiderer, 1983). Evidently, pass-through is asymmetric
and increasing whenever demand curvature (t) rises with t, or equivalently, rises with the
market price, p.
Suppose that demand takes the logistic form p(Q) =     log[Q=(1   Q)], where
market output Q 2 (0; 1). It is easy to check that the marginal rate of cost pass-through
equals (t) = [1   Q(t)] 2 (0; 1). So this demand curve satises the usual assumption
of log-concavity. Since demand slopes down and pass-through is strictly positive, optimal
output falls as cost rises, dQ(t)=dt < 0.
It follows that pass-through is non-constant; specically, marginal pass-through is
increasing, d(t)=dt > 0. So large price rises are passed on relatively more strongly than
small increases and prices rise more strongly than they fall.
Moreover, even in this basic model, the degree of asymmetry in pass-through can be
very large. Suppose, as above, that the cost shifter varies on an interval [0; T ]. It follows
that pass-through rises monotonically from 1 Q(0) to 1 Q(T ). In principle, that is,
for some values of , , and T , this can be consistent with pass-through rising from close
to 0% to almost 100% as cost rise (perhaps over time).7
This example also illustrates how a more protable rm can have a greater incentive
to absorb cost increases; this is a frequent claim, for example, in policy discussions
around the impact of environmental taxes. Recall that an optimizing monopolists prots
decline as its cost rises (by revealed preference). It follows immediately that, in this
example, situations with low costs involve both high prots and low cost pass-through.
Furthermore, this is an implication of static optimizing behaviour that does not rely on
any dynamic considerations.
3 Asymmetric pass-through under perfect competition
This section shows how the same phenomena of increasing, constant, and decreasing asym-
metric pass-through can also arise in a simple model without any market power.
Model setup. Consider a competitive market with a direct demand curve D(p) and an
industry supply curve S(p   t), where t is a cost shifter as in the previous section. Note
that this denes demand in terms of the consumer price, p, and supply in terms of the
producer price, p  t. Balancing supply and demand requires that S(p  t) = D(p).
Marginal cost pass-through. Treat the resulting equilibrium price p(t) as a function
of the cost shifter, and, just as above, let (t)  (p(t))  [dp(t)=dt] denote the marginal
rate of cost pass-through.
7The equilibrium output Q(t) here solves the equation log[Q=(1 Q)] + 1=(1 Q) = (  c  t)=.
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Lemma 2. The marginal rate of cost pass-through under perfect competition equals
(t) = S0=(S0  D0) and is always (weakly) less than 100%.
Proof. Di¤erentiating the equilibrium condition gives 0 =  S0(p(t)   t) + S0(p(t)  
t)(dp=dt)   D0(p(t))(dp=dt). Rearranging this gives the expression for marginal pass-
through.
Under perfect competition, marginal pass-through can take on any value between zero
and 100%, depending on the details of demand and supply conditions (in relative terms). In
the special case with a horizontal supply curve (innitely elastic supply), so that marginal
cost is a constant, pass-through is always exactly 100%. Unlike in models with market
power, it is not possible for it to exceed 100%, so the equilibrium producer price, p(t)  t,
always falls (weakly) with higher cost.
The pass-through rate from Lemma 2 is often stated in terms of demand elasticities.
Dene the price elasticity of demand as D  [ pD0(p)=D(p)] > 0, and the price elasticity
of supply as S  [pS0(p)=S(p)] > 0. Consider a small cost shifter, specically the
limiting case t ! 0. Then, recalling that S(p) = D(p), marginal pass-through can be
written as (0) = S=(S + D), where the elasticities are evaluated at the corresponding
equilibrium price p(0). Note that this simple expression in terms of elasticities holds
solely for the case of an innitesimal cost rise.
Non-marginal cost pass-through. Suppose now that the cost shifter t rises over an
interval [0; T ], so that t = T . The non-marginal rate of pass-through is thus dened as




0 (t)dt, so the two coincide only where d(t)=dt = 0 (linear pricing).
Proposition 2 (a) Cost pass-through under perfect competition is constant, d(t)=dt = 0,
if and only if ddt [ D0(p(t))=S0(p(t)  t)] = 0 for all t 2 [0; T ]; otherwise, there is either
increasing or decreasing asymmetric pass-through somewhere on the interval [0; T ].
(b) Suppose that the supply curve is not horizontal, S0() < 1; then pass-through is
increasing if the supply curve is concave, S00()  0, and the demand curve is convex,
D00()  0, in price, with at least one strict inequality, for all t 2 [0; T ].
Proof. For (a), the necessary and su¢ cient condition follows by inspection of the expres-
sion for marginal pass-through from Lemma 2, making explicit the potential dependency
of the slopes of demand and supply curves on the cost shifter t, via the equilibrium price



















which holds if S00()  0 and D00()  0, with at least one strict inequality, as claimed
(since  2 (0; 1) by Lemma 2).
Once again, cost pass-through will only be symmetric under special conditions on
demand and supply. The obvious case is where both the demand curve and industry
supply are both linear (or a¢ ne) functions, such that D0() and S0() are constants.
A simple su¢ cient condition for increasing cost pass-through is that the demand curve
is strictly convex, combined with an industry supply curve that is weakly concave over
the price interval [p(0); p(T )]. The demand condition is certainly plausible; several
demand curves that are frequently employed by economists are everywhere strictly convex
(including exponential and constant-elasticity demand), and others exhibit this property
at least over some range (such as logistic demand from the monopoly example above).
The condition of concave supply is consistent with marginal cost that rises with industry
output and is weakly convex which again seems a plausible case. For instance, with
constant-elasticity supply of the form S(p) = KpS , the condition S00()  0 is equivalent
to inelastic supply S  1, that is, industry supply rises with price but proportionally less
so at a higher price.8
As in the previous section, these conditions are not ruled out by anything in economic
theory and are consistent with optimizing behaviour by all agents.
The bottom line is that, even in the absence of market power, economic theory can
account for any of increasing, constant, and decreasing cost pass-through; which of these
obtains in practice is simply a question of demand and supply.
4 Relationship with the empirical evidence
This section discusses the extant empirical ndings on asymmetric pricing, from both
static and dynamic perspectives, and their relationship with the results from the previous
two sections.
The empirical literature on asymmetric cost pass-through and rockets and feathers
contains a range of ndings. The headline result, often associated with Peltzman (2000),
is that prices rise faster than they fall. What does this mean?
First is the result that, in the short run (say over a few months), a cost increase
raises price by more than an identically-sized cost decrease pushes price down but that
in the long run (say over a few quarters), the absolute magnitudes of these responses
are the same. Second, another nding is that the long-run price impact, in some markets,
is also asymmetric, with rises more pronounced than falls.
Observe that the rst result implies that pass-through, at some point between the
short- and long-term, must be asymmetric and decreasing, with the cost increase feeding
8This has a somewhat similar avour to the argument due to Kimmel (2009) that the administrative
and organizational costs that rms incur in raising output, in response to a cost drop, are signicantly
higher than those required to decrease output faced with a cost increase; loosely speaking, this can be
interpreted as a convexity in the marginal cost function.
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through less strongly to cost, and that the second result implies that pass-through must
also have been asymmetric on the upside at some point in the short- or medium-term.
Can the above results from economic theory explain these results? Obviously a sta-
tic theory cannot generate a dynamic price path, at least not without some auxiliary
interpretation.9 What the above models can explain is an asymmetry in the equilib-
rium price response. This can be thought of as the move from an old to a new
equilibrium as governed by Proposition 1 or 2. Depending on demand conditions and
industry supply/conduct, there could be increasing, constant, or decreasing pass-through
over a su¢ ciently long term to be consistent with equilibrium. And if the end pointsare
di¤erent depending on whether costs have rises or fallen, it is much less surprising to see
some asymmetric response along the way.10 Put another way, di¤erences in the strength
of pass-through may equally rationalize di¤erences in its speed.
The key point is that the empirical literature on asymmetric pricing to date has not
actually tested whether or not simple theory can account for asymmetric pass-through. The
simple theory is rejected out of hand at the outset; it then (implicitly) forms the basis
for the null hypothesis of symmetric pass-through against which the empirical estimates
are then compared. The point of this paper is that this symmetric counterfactual is
misleading since even simple theory can yield asymmetric pricing.
A proper empirical test would have to compare the observed pass-through patters with
those predicted by a simple theory, which itself is calibrated to the demand and supply
conditions estimated from market data and then determine to what degree pass-through
patterns are still left unexplained. This is a much more challenging task which, as far as
I am aware, the existing literature has not taken up.11
What pass-through patterns would be generated by a simple model with an convex
pricing function depends on a range of detailed factors; this includes the fraction of up and
down movements in costs, their magnitudes and volatility as well as the ne sequencing
of the cost changes. Again, the existing literature does not appear to engage much with
such statistics as explanatory variables.
The bottom line is that the empirical literature to date has not seriously tested the
explanatory power of simple theories, and that, in principle, these might account for a
signicant portion of observed pricing asymmetries certainly those for the long run
estimates covering 6 months or so. The real question for future empirical research lies in
determining this degree of explanatory power of simple theory.
9 It does not seem right or constructive to criticize a static theory solely on the grounds that it is static.
10The vast majority of static economic models are based on the existence of a unique equilibrium.
If so, a given set of rms cost conditions implies a particular market price. This applies both before
and after any cost change, so the pass-through rate is also unique. Put di¤erently, such models are not
history-dependent; they cannot explain why identical cost conditions might lead to di¤erent prices (or
pass-through). Yet it is not clear whether the existing empirical evidence on pass-through shows that
exactly the same conditions on rm costs and everything else lead to di¤erent price outcomes.
11Another consideration is that cost measures used in practice may conate marginal costs and xed
costs. From a theory viewpoint, this does not matter since changes in xed costs do not a¤ect prices, so
any evidence for asymmetric pass-through must be due to changes in marginal costs.
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5 Concluding remarks & policy implications
This paper has argued that asymmetric pass-through can be explained, in principle, even
by simple price theory. This includes the phenomena of price rising more strongly, and
more weakly, than they fall, and does not rely on imperfect competition.
Put sharply, the widespread claim that simple economics cannot explain asymmetric
pass-through is false; put less sharply, whether or not simple models can explain asym-
metric pass-through across di¤erent markets has not actually been formally tested in the
empirical literature.
The purpose of this paper has not been to develop new models but rather to address
the question of asymmetric pass-through by looking at some very well-known economic
models in a slightly di¤erent way.
If anything, the shortcoming of the theory of pass-through is a failure to rule out not
a failure to rule in, as claimed in the existing literature. For suitably chosen demand
and supply conditions, essentially any pass-through behaviour can be rationalized. Put
di¤erently, it is not easy to reject these models, at least not based on pass-through patterns
alone.
To be clear, this paper does not say that the factors identied by the extant literature
as drivers of asymmetric pricing such as vertical integration or consumer search costs
are irrelevant or wrong. Rather it criticizes that these papers take a potentially misleading
starting point by dismissing simple theory out of hand.
Deploying more richly specied models widens even further the economists ability to
rationalize observed pass-through rates. The analysis here has restricted attention to the
normalcase where pass-through is positive. However, it has been known for 100 years
that pass-through can turn negative for a monopolist selling multiple products; this is
Edgeworths taxation paradox(Edgeworth, 1925).12
What can be learned from a policy perspective? The answer, alas, is not all that
much. Pass-through is a useful tool to understand competition in market, assuming the
underlying competitive model is known (Weyl and Fabinger, 2013). In practice, however,
the mode of competition is unknown, so the question becomes whether pass-through can
help identifyit. The basic conclusion from the present analysis is that it cannot. Suppose
you had perfect knowledge that pass-through in a market is 70% and symmetric, or that
it is asymmetric with, on average, 80% on the upside and only 60% on the downside. This
says little about the mode of competition.
The only robust inference appears to be the following: A pass-through rate above
100%, under wide assumptions, is inconsistent with perfect competition, and so is strong
evidence for some degree of market power (but not necessarily of collusion). Saying more
than this requires much more detailed empirical analysis of a market.
12Alternatively, if cost movements induce changes in the set of active rms (entry and exit), so the market
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